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THE STANDARD OF CARE IN EMERGENCIES
ALvIx E. EvANs*
1.

WHAT IS AN EMERGENCY9

A general definition of an emergency is sometimes attempted
by the courts, as in Iowa, where it has been said that an
emergency is a sudden or unexpected happening or occasion
calling for immediate action.' Obviously this definition does
not give an adequate basis for an emergency instruction to the
jury Generally there are the following elements in emergency
cases (a) the actor finds himself in a position where sudden
peril threatens himself or another, or both, (b) he has available
alternative courses of action, (c) there is no adequate opportunity to consider which is the better alternative; (d) he is aware of
the emergency;2 (e) an injury results from the choice made.
It would therefore appear that the trial judge should not give
an emergency instruction to the jury, either where there were
no alternatives, or where there was time for the actor to deliberate, or where the course taken by hin was the obvious one.
Other instructions will be more appropriate. Kentucky has
formulated an instruction for such cases. 3
* Dean, University of Kentucky Law School.
'Burger v. Omaha Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 645, 117 N. W 35 (1908),
Colfax Co. v. Butler, 83 Neb. 803, 120 N. W 444 (1909) (sinilar).
2Feck v. Bell Line Inc., 284 Ky. 288, 144 S. W (2d) 483 (1940)
'Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Ramey, 222 Ky. 286, 288,
300 S. W 890, 891 (1928)
"Although you may believe from the
evidence that the plaintiff's car was damaged in the collision with
defendant's taxicab, yet if you further believe from the evidence that
at said time and place the defendant's driver, while exercising ordinary care in the operation of the taxicab, was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted by an approaching car, and thereby placed in
nunment danger of great bodily harm, real or to him reasonably
apparent, then he had the right to operate his taxicab in such a
manner as a reasonably prudent man would have done under similar
circumstances to avoid such danger, if any, considering traffic conditions upon the street at the time; and if under such conditions he
did so operate said taxicab and in-so doing ran upon and damaged
plaintiff's car, the defendant is not liable therefor." See also Moreland v. Stone, 292 Ky 521, 166 S.W (2d) 998 (1942).
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There is not much discussion in the books of the standard of
care in emergencies. They do speak briefly of an active choice
between'risks 4 or mistakes made in cases of sudden peril. But the
problem has not loomed large. Like contributory negligence,
it need not be pleaded but is open to proof, and the burden of
proof is on the party claiming the benefit of an emergency 6
An early intimation of the source of the present emergency
doctrine is perhaps traceable to the famous Squib case."
Fright and Confuszon. Many, perhaps most people will
not react altogether rationally when faced with sudden danger,

either to themselves or to another. Thus, the defendant, a
driver, on suddenly finding a child on the running board, turned
out of the highway and struck a telephone pole, thus killing the
child. Not only did the court not give a res ipsa loquitur
instruction, but even directed a verdict for the defendant.3
Another defendant put his foot on the accelerator instead of on
the brakes and did not sound his claxon. This time the court
on Torts (12th ed. 1923) 484.
'Prosser on Torts (1941) p. 242, devotes about one page to the
subject and there appears to be no observation on it by Harper on
Torts (1933)
See Notes, 13 N. Y. L. Q. R. 120 (1936), 9 Notre Dame
Lawyer 244 (1934) 5 Temple L. Quart. 665 (1931)
6 A. L. R. 680;
27 ib. 1179; 79 A. L. R. 1277" 111 ib. 1019; Cf. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 154
(1936), 9 Col. L. Rev 621 (1909), Restatement of Torts, secs. 296, 470.
8
McKeever v Batcher, 219 Iowa 93, 257 N. W 567 (1934). See
Alabama Great So. Ry. Co. v. Hunt, 86 So. 97 (Ala. App. 1920)
reversed in 204 Ala. 504, 86 So. 100 (1920).
7 Scott v Shepherd, 2 W Bl. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K. B. 1773)
where it was held that the two intervening squib throwers acted
instinctively or automatically and thus were not liable for the
ultimate injury and did not break the causation of the original act.
See also Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark 493, 171 Eng. Rep. 540 (N. P 1816)
("If I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a perilous
alternative I am responsible for the consequences"), Coulter v. Am.
Merchants Un. Co., 56 N. Y. 585 (1874) (Plaintiff faced with sudden
emergency, a horse and wagon being upon her, instinctively jumped
to one side and struck a wall and injured herself. She is justified in
jumping without looking)
This matter is further developed on
pages 215-218. There is no emergency heading in the Century
Digest, 1658-1896. There is a heading with five citations in the First
Decenmal Digest, 1897-1906, Negligence, sec. 134 (28). One notes
the close correspondence of the popular use of the automobile.
8
Young v Hofferber, 177 Wash. 234, 31 P (2d) 95 (1934), Harrigan v. Interurban Ry. Co., 167 Iowa 679, 149 N. W 895 (1914) (A
section hand on a hand car saw an approaching tram and because of
his fright, loosed his hold on the handle and fell off. The question
of his contributory negligence is for the jury), Polonofsky v.
Dobrosky, 313 Pa. 73, 169 At. 93 (1933) (Defendant did not turn off
onto the shoulder of the highway to prevent a collision with an oncoming car, because of her fright and confusion. Sued by guest
rider).
4Pollock
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left it to the jury whether he showed adequate alertness in an
emergency 9 So it is held that a defendant who seizes the wheel
from the driver and runs the vehicle into a building by the
street side is not liable for damages, his act being due to
fright.io
Fright and confusion have become so associated with an
emergency that the question has been raised whether a person
who testified that he was perfectly calm could clain an
emergency instruction and the lower court ruled that he was
contributorilv negligent under the circumstances.1
There are
many cases where the party in an emergency has no alternative
at all. 12 In that event he should not be required to excuse his
conduct by seeking an emergency instruction.
True alternatives. There are many cases of true alternatives.' 3 Thus, if a child has been struck by a street car and is
'Hood v. Stowe, 181 N. Y. S. 734 (App. D. 1920).
"oHooks v. Ortor, 30 S. W (2d) 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See 5
Temple L. Q. 665 (1931). See also Knowlan v. Shipley-Massmgham
Co., 266 Pa. 117, 109 Atl. 629 (1920) (A child was injured by
defendant. On action by the parents, the defendant claimed an
instruction on contributory negligence because the mother permitted the child to escape from her. The mother was granted an
emergency instruction on account of fright and confusion).
ITriestram v. Way, 286 Mich. 13, 281 N. W 420 (1938) (Calmness will not prevent an emergency instruction).
=Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S. W (2d) 684 (1929)
(Due to bad coupler, plaintiff was obliged to operate it by hand.
Because of the disturbance of the moving cars, he was compelled to
fall or to step from the engine pilot-was hurt), Ransom v. Union
Depot Co., 126 S. W 785 (Mo. App. 1910) (Expressman unloading a
truck moved the truck on the sudden approach of a tram to a track
where another truck was. It thus collided with the other truck and
the latter was forced onto the same track. It was hurled by the tram
and struck the plaintiff).
Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Noller, 36 F (2d) 443 (7thi 1930)
(Defendant's bus driver had two alternatives, when another car had
cut in ahead of him and suddenly stopped: (a) turn right into the
curb and concrete abutment; (b) turn left into the traffic from the
opposite direction. The choice of going ahead and striking the car
ahead does not seem to be a true alternative); Louisville & N. Ry.
Co. v. Wright, 193 Ky. 59, 235 S. W 1 (1921) (Fireman caught between engine and tender. Engineer may stop and back up or go
forward), Wynn v. Central Park Ry. Co., 133 N. Y. 575, 30 N. E. 721
(1892) (Horse drawn street car's brake broken. Driver may shout
to persons ahead, or drive team off track. It seems to be no alternative to say he may keep ,on going); Stabenan v. Atlantic Co., 155
N. Y. 511, 30 N. E. 277 (1898) (Child on street car track. Motorman
may shut off power and apply brakes or reverse the power and risk
blowing a fuse); Raolaslovic v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 246 N. Y. 91,
156 N. E. 625 (1927) (Deck hand of a vessel fell overboard and
drowned by suction of the propeller, when the engines were
reversed. Pilot had choice to reverse or proceed. If reversal is
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under it, the alternatives may be- to go forward, to back up, or
to jack up the car. 14 The failure to adopt the better course is
not necessarily evidence of negligence. So a fireman on a railway saw a vehicle near a crossing which his tram was approaching and could himself have set the brakes and could have sounded
the alarm. He may not be regarded as negligent under the
circumstances, however, if, instead of doing these possible acts,
he warned the engineer and thus occasioned delay of the d6ing of
the act which the circumstances required.15 An emergency
instruction was given. 'Where action must be taken as soon as
it is reasonably possible but there is, m fact, a period available
for deliberation, the court may refuse a party an emergency
instruction.1 6
The emergency doctrine excuses the actor from adopting the
course or method which would perhaps have been the better or
best one. Thus, a flagman's motioning may be misunderstood;17
the driver of an express truck, in haste to avoid an oncoming
tram, may not adequately consider the safety of others;18 a
driver who sees oncoming traffic in a narrow street has no time
shown to be good seamanship, petition should be dismissed)- Ackerman v. Union Traction Co., 205 Pa. 477, 55 Atl. 16 (1903) (Boy on
steps of a caboose running on track parallel to a very near street car
track. Moving street car would hit hin. Motorman could either
stop or shout advice to jump off or climb onto bumper); Brown v.
French, 104 Pa. 604 (1883) (Plaintiff's intestate tried to cross river
and fouled a barge in tow of a steamer. The pilot of steamer could
either back while decedent was thus under water or go forward);
Gumz v. C. St. P & M. Ry Co., 52 Wis. 672, 10 N. W 11 (1881) (Hand
car about to be overtaken by train. Operator may stop and get off
or speed ahead), Lynch v. Northern Pac. Ry Co., 84 Wis. 352, 54
N. W 610 (1893) (Plaintiff's horses running wildly along highway
close to and paralleling the railway. The tram may check speed or
stop); Bishop v. Belle City St. Railway Co., 92 Wis. 139, 65 N. W 733
(1896).
Y Carney v. Concord St. Ry Co., 72 N. H. 364, 57 Atl. 218 (1903).
Collette v Boston & M. R. R., 83 N. H. 210, 140 AUt. 176 (1927).
'Peabody v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 80 Mont. 492, 261 Pac. 261
(1927) (A gate keeper at a crossing where many railway tracks
crossed a street, had raised the bar after a train had passed, thus
admitting the plaintiff to pass from the north onto the tracks. Then
he saw a switching engine approaching on a track which plaintiff
had already crossed. He also saw a vehicle coming from the south
a considerable distance away. To prevent the latter from entering
the trackage area, he again lowered the bar and struck plaintiff with
it. His evidence showed that he anticipated plaintiff would be hit.
There was no adequate reason for the immediate dropping of the bar.
IFloyd v. P & R. Co., 162 Pa. 29, 29 Atl. 396 (1894).
'Ransom v. Union Depot Co., 126 S. W 785 (Mo. App. 1910).
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for a nice calculation of the available space left to himself ;19
a rider m the rear of a truck, which truck narrowly escaped a
rear end collision, may not be able accurately to estimate his own
hazards and may injure himself by jumping;20 a driver may
unwisely prepare to jump by failure to calculate the speed of a
car coming from the side.21 The most singular example found of
mistaken conduct which may still not amount to contributory
negligence because of the emergency is the case of a woman who
lost her balance while alighting from a bus, seized the rear
bumper and was dragged three-fourths of a mile. 2 2 So one who
mistakenly shuts off a fan operating m a mine to blow away
obnoxious gases, believing the cessation to be necessary because
of a fire ragag in the mine, may have an emergency instruction, 23 as also a motorman who, having knocked a child under
the street car, backs up the car, and perhaps runs over the child
again; 24 and a plaintiff who rides on a wagon about to cross a
railway track is not imprudent in leaping from the wagon,
though the team, becoming frightened, ran along the track but
was not touched by the tram.25 "One may act mistakenly, yet
prudently "26
Emergency created by ch Idren. When young children are
injured, they are not guilty of contributory negligence. Where a
child is injured there are four possible solutions. (1) Defendant's negligence will create a liability, though the child did not
exercise care ;2 (2) There was an inevitable accident which does
not call for an emergency rule;28 (3) A question of last clear
'Austin v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry Co., 269 Mass. 420, 169 N. E.
484 (1929). And see Tate v. Collins, 266 Ky. 322, 98 S. W (2d) 938
(1936) and Pennington v. Pure Milk Co., 279 Ky 235, 130 S. W (2d)
24 (1939).
'Smith v Reading Transit Co., 282 Pa. 511, 128 Aft. 439 (1925).
1 Betzold v. Rossi Floral Co., 23 P (2d) 839 (Cal. App. 1933).
"Elmore v. Des Momes City Ry. Co., 207 Iowa 862, 224 N. W 28
(1929).
'Hughes v. Oregon Improvement Co., 20 Wash. 294, 55 Pac. 119

(1898).
" Bittner v. Crosstown Ry. Co., 153 N. Y. 76, 46 N. E. 1044 (1897).
'Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Wilkms, 149 Ky. 35, 147 S. W 759 (1912).
'Kane v. Worcester Con. St. Ry., 182 Mass. 201, 65 N. E. 54
(1902).
"Lederer v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 520, 111 Atl. 785 (1920)
(Child five years old on tricycle in the middle of street car track;
motorman negligent in not sounding gong, or dropping fender, or
stopping car). See Restatement of Torts.
"Pennmgton v. Pure Milk Co., 279 Ky. 235, 130 S. W (2d) 24
(1939) (Boys coasting onto highway, vehicle driven from opposite
direction unable to miss them by any degree of care-Directed
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chance may arise, and (4) Defendant may claim an emergency
2
instruction to offset the application of the last clear chance.
Somewhat similar to the case of children is that of the
country bumpkin on whom a practical joke was played.30
Plaintiff, a man about 40, was riding for the first time on a railway Another passenger, abetted by the tram crew, threatened
to take him to Chattanooga and on his arrival there have him
shot as a spy Other terroistic threats, such as the removal of his
vital parts, were made to him. Plaintiff became frightened and
leaped through a window of the moving tram to escape his
tormentors and was injured. In answer to the plea of contributory negligence the court instructed the jury that it should not
find him guilty of contributory negligence, if a reasonably
prudent man would have done as he did under similar circumstances. It also said that it made no difference whether he was a
Solomon or a simpleton. The jury found for the plaintiff. It is
submitted that there were other adequate grounds for holding
the defendant and that, in fact, a reasonably prudent man would
not have been thus terrorized nor would he have jumped from
the tram. This shows that an emergency instruction was not
the proper procedure, for due prudence must be used, even in an
emergency
Emergency and the Last Clear Chance. The plaintiff's
injury may be the result of (a) an inevitable accident, (b) his
own negligence, (c) his own negligence and that of defendant,.
(d) the plaintiff may have put himself in a position of peril,
seeing which the defendant might, with due prudence, have
avoided the harm, (e) either defendant or plaintiff may have
had no time to deliberate and as a consequence have failed to
follow the course winch might have avoided the accident.
In Hartley v Lasater5 l the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle
and, unknown to him, the defendant was driving behind him.
verdict for defendant. Child killed was 13). See Note 90 infra.
Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684 (1920) (Boy on
wrong side of street on roller skates suddenly turned in front of car)
2Donker v. Powers, 230 Mich. 237, 202 N. W 989 (1925)

(Children were on bicycles and at least one was on the wrong side
of the road. It is a jury question whether defendant was faced
with an emergency and, if so, whether he acted prudently. The
children were respectively 18, 16, and 14.)

8'Alabama Great So. R. Co. v. Hunt, 86 So. 97 (1920) reversed

in 204 Ala. 504, 86 So. 100 (1920)
"96 Wash. 407, 165 Pac. 106 (1917).
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The plaintiff crossed to the left without warning, to take a side
road, and was struck by the defendant. The plaintiff, admitting
his own negligence, claimed that the defendant had the last
clear chance. The court gave an excellent discussion of the last
clear chance doctrine and of an emergency The last clear chance
implies that there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
culmnating in peril from which he could not extricate himself,
that the defeidant knew of the plaintiff's peril and was able to
avoid injury to him by the exercise of reasonable care. So it
implies an opportunity for thought and mental direction.
The court intimated that the defendant may have been faced
with an emergency if the accident occurred while he was driving
at a proper speed and when he had no adequate period for
deliberation. In this way, he might avoid liability A finding
against a last clear chance would thus be explained either by
unavoidable accident as matters then stood or by an emergency
So an occasion permitting deliberation invokes a last clear
chance instruction and implies a denial of an emergency instruction.32 If the evidence on the point is conflicting probably an
33
instruction involving each doctrine is desirable.
In Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roschli's Admr 34
there was some expression in the opinion concerning an
emergency facing the defendant, but the evidence seems to show
that there was no last clear chance and no choice of alternatives
and a verdict was directed for the defendant. In Sieb v Central
Pennsylvania Traction Co.35 the plaintiff excused Ins otherwise
contributorily negligent conduct by the emergency facing him
and the defendant was held to have been negligent in not anticipating the injury In Jones v Boston & H. R. Co.3 6 the plaintiff's intestate was approachmg a railway crossing and due to
storm and ram beating on the top of his truck, did not see or
hear a tram approaching. It is not wholly clear whether or not
*2Norwood Transportation Co. v. Bickell, 207 Ala. 232, 92 So.
464 (1922).
"Lange v. Affleck, 160 Md. 695, 155 Atl. 150 (1931).
186 Ky. 371, 216 S.W 579 (1919).
47 Pa. Sup. 228 (1911). See also Austin v. Eastern Mass. St.
Ry. Co., 269 Mass. 420, 169 N. E. 484 (1929) (Plaintiff was faced with

an emergency in that two vehicles were approaching and plaintiff,
fearing the space was too narrow otherwise, turned right onto a
street car track and just ahead of a street car. He was entitled to
an emergency instruction to excuse his own conduct and a last
clear chance instruction respecting the conduct of defendant).
., 83 N. H. 73, 139 Atl. 214 (1927).
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he had been previously negligent. It was held, however, that
the evidence did not warrant an emergency instruction in favor
of the defendant but rather the situation made a last clear chance
instruction appropriate. The defendant railway, in checking
speed, did not sand the rails. Even this, however, would have
been ineffective as the only chance of rescue was to warn the
driver. The evidence was in some conflict whether the whistle
was sounded. The engineer was found to have sensed the situation when he was some 50-60-feet away A railway should be
on the lookout for vehicles at a crossing and for that reason was
not entitled to an emergency instruction. If there was a last
clear chance it consisted in blowing the whistle. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff puts himself in peril and on discovery of
his peril does not endeavor to avoid it, he cannot claim the
privilege of throwing the burden on the defendant through the
last clear chance. 37
Sometimes the emergency offers no true alternative, as the
one course is merely the converse of the other, like Hamlet's
"to be or not to be."
Both the plaintiff and the defendant may seek an emergency
instruction, the former to avoid the imputation of contributory
negligence and the latter to show that his course was not, under
the circumstances, negligent. Thus, in Wilson v. Roachk3 the
defendant was proceeding along the street at a point where the
space was just sufficient for traffic to pass in both directions.
The plaintiff, coming in the opposite direction, had stopped her
buggy, thus blocking traffic. Just before the defendant reached
the area opposite the plaintiff, a car parked on his right suddenly
backed out and defendant turned sharply left to avoid it.
In this way he struck the plaintiff. He contended both that the
emergency forced lm to make a hurried choice and also that
the plaintiff was negligent in jumping from her vehicle and
putting herself in a spot where it was impossible to avoid her.
She, on the other hand, contended that she acted in an emergency
"Birmgham Ry. v. Aetna Accd. Co., 184 Ala. 601, 64 So. 44
(1913). See Ramey v. Oregon Short-Line Ry. Co., 64 Utah 445, 231
Pac. 807 (1924) (Plaintiff in position of peril. Defendant either had
a last clear chance or acted under emergency conditions. An
emergency instruction granted); Sheffield v. Umon Oil Co., 82 Wash.
386, 144 Pac. 529 (1914); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac.
684 (1920) (Contributory negligence of plaintiff, no last clear chance,
but emergency for defendant).
" 101 Okla. 30, 222 Pac. 1000 (1924).
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in leaving the vehicle and that the defendant was negligent in
failing to stop. The defendant was granted an emergency
instruction. Presumably the result would have been the same if
the jury had been given such an instruction for each of the parties. If each acted under an emergency and prior negligence was
absent, the result is an inevitable accident. In Luce v Chandler3 9 the defendant, while passing a car, suddenly saw the
plaintiff coming. He turned right into the ditch to avoid the
car he was passing. The plaintiff did not apply his brakes for
fear of skidding and it turned out that he hit the defendant.
It was held that the former and not the latter was entitled to an
emergency instruction, because in the latter's case he was driving
at too high a speed.

2.

IMMEDALTE DANGER TO ACTOR ONLY, FoREsEEABLE.

This means that the actor sees immediate danger to himself,
but does not, because of the emergency, foresee danger to others,
although it is present. Five cases have been found which
answer this description. In Barnhart v. Amerzwan Glycersne
Co.4 0 the defendant was driving a truck loaded with nitroglycerin. On discovering that the truck was on fire, the driver
abandoned it on a steep hill without setting the brakes or
securing it against moving. As a consequence, it backed down
hill and injured the plaintiff. A verdict for the plaintiff was
reversed and the lower court was directed to enter judgment for
the defendant. The expectable events, overturning and exploding, did not occur. In Moody v. Gulf Refinzng Co. 41 an
employee of the defendant was engaged in unloading a tank-car
filled with gasoline. While emptying the spout at the bottom of
the tank into a tub he was warned that rock blasting was going
on nearby He ran away to escape the danger. The tub overflowed and the overflow ignited and set fire to the plaintiff's
building. There was a directed verdict for the defendant.
Similarly, where a restaurant employee picked up an
improperly lighted gasoline lamp, carried it outside, and threw
it away from himself, as a consequence of which it exploded,
1224 Mass.

420, 113 N. E. 199 (1916).
113 Kan. 136, 213 Pac. 663 (1923).
41142 Tenn. 280, 218 S. W 817 (1920).
40
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injuring the plaintiff, an involuntary non-suit was sustained on
account of the emergency facing the defendant. 4 2 So one who
backfires about his own premises to protect them from a prairie
fire and whose fire joins the other fire, is, as a matter of law, not
liable, though the plantiff's property is thereby destroyed.
It may well be here that the defendant's act was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. However, a judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed, due to the emergency which the defendant
had to meet. 43 In the same way, judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed in FUippone v. Besenburger4 4 The plaintiff was being
employed as a brick mason and was standing on the runway
which extended into an excavation where a building was being
constructed. One end of the runway rested on a barrel. The
defendant, who was in the excavation, tried to climb upon the
runway and stepped upon the barrel, which was near hin.
The barrel tipped over and the defendant caught the feet of the
plaintiff, standing close by, in order to save himself from a fall.
This caused the plaintiff to fall and to suffer an injury
No negligence was shown on the part of the defendant other
than this.
One may compare another type of case where the matter of
the lack of opportunity for deliberation was made prominent.
In Brzcker v. Freeman45 B seized A by the arm and violently
swung him around two or three tines, then let him go. A became
dizzy and involuntarily came violently against C, who instantly
pushed him away, and he came in contact with a hook and was
injured. One issue was whether 0 had tine for deliberation and
'Donahue v. Kelly, 181 Pa. 93, 37 Atl. 186 (1897).
4Owen v. Cook, 9 N. D. 134, 81 N. W 285 (1899).
119 N. Y. S. 632 (App. D. 1909).

50 N. H. 420 (1870).

This is exactly like the squib case, Scott

v. Shepherd, 2 W Bl. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K. B. 1773). In the
matter of instinctive action, Laidlaw v Sage, 37 N. Y. S. 770, 773

(App. D. 1896) is similar, but it differs in that defendant's act may

have been directly causal.

Sage was threatened by one Norcross

that the latter would destroy the building where the parties were
with dynamite unless Sage should hand the latter a large sum of
money. Plaintiff was standing nearby and Sage pulled him in

between Norcross and himself. At once Norcross dropped the
satchel of dynamite and the explosion from it injured plaintiff. The
jury was instructed that if Sage moved the plaintiff involuntarily,
i.e., without any formed intention to do so, he would not be liable.
In 158 N. Y. 73, 53 N. E. 679 (1899) it was held that causation between Sage's act and plaintiff's injury was lacking. See Note in 7
Harv. L. Rev. 302 (1894). On the face of the matter causation,
though possibly involuntary, was present.

EMERGENCEmS--CARE REQUIRED

reflection before he gave A the push, if not, he was not liable to
A. The jury found that since C acted instinctively there was no
break in the causation from the act of B.
The five first mentioned eases go much farther than the
typical case later cited, for there can be no question of lack of
causation. They have the common element of failure of opportunity for deliberation, though it is difficult to think that the
defendant acted instinctively and wholly without reasoning.
This later emergency doctrine, however, does not require that
the act be done instinctively and without any deliberation in
order to excuse the actor. One is entitled to an emergency
instruction when his choice of alternatives must be made so
hurriedly that he does not or cannot make the choice a reasonable man would have made if he had full opportunity for
deliberation. Courts have not been able to consider degrees of
emergency Apparently res spsa loquitur does not apply under
such circumstances. The later developed rule seems to be that
when an actor is faced with immediate danger to himself he may
choose the alternative favorable to himself when he does not
have adequate opportunity to consider fully the possible consequences of his act to unidentified other persons. We have as yet
no answer to the question how far one may protect himself by
casting the danger upon another identified person. A note
writer in the Harvard Law Review 46 on the Owen v. Cook
case says
"One may not in all cases protect himself at the expense of his
neighbor, even though the danger be imminent and to say that compulsive necessity will excuse, is to introduce a standard too unstable
and too indefinite for a rule of law.
It therefore seems correct
to say that where the act done under stress of circumstances is the
result of the exercise of the reasoning faculties however rapid, the
actor is subjected to the ordinary rules of legal liability.

What

then is the criterion in those cases where one in warding off danger
from himself, forces it onto another?"
The writer concludes that the key lies in the issue of instinctiveness v. deliberation of the actor. The earliest of the five cases
is dated 1897 and the latest is of the year 1923. It appears that
even as the Harvard note was being written a new step was
being taken. "Compulsive necessity" will not justify one in
protecting himself by thrusting the danger upon his neighbor in
an emergency But there is this difference. In the five cases
one's "neighbor" is not an identified person. He-is-any member
13 Harv. L. Rev. 599 (1900).

L. J.-2
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of the public who, foreseeably to others but not to the actor, may
innocently place himself in the danger zone. In the problem of
the Harvard note writer the plaintiff is an identified person
whom- the actor seeks to substitute for himself, as in the Laidlaw
47
v. Sage case.
These cases seem to constitute a landmark in the development of the emergency doctrine. Originally the defendant was
not liable when his act was to such an extent instinctive or
involuntary that he did not break the causal connection of the
act of an earlier actor, A, taking effect upon X through himself.
Next defendant's act is causal itself but he instinctively substitutes B, an ascertained individual, in his stead to bear the risk.
In the third stage his act is causal and is not merely instinctive.
The danger need not threaten himself alone or perhaps not at all,
but threatens others, or himself, or both. There is at least a brief
period to consider alternatives and defendant, due to the
emergency, does not make the best choice of alternatives. It
seems to make no difference whether defendent's act is one of
commission or of omission. This is our usual emergency doctrine.
Finally, the immediate danger threatens defendant only Were
it not for his fright and confusion, defendant could forsee that
his act would probably injure some other person. He thrusts
that danger from himself onto another person who is identified
by the event and the actor is protected by the fact of acting in
an emergency
Perhaps under this later principle the result would be
similar to that rule, also recent, where a defendant uses the
property of another in an emergency but may be required to pay
the damage so occurring, if causation is clearly present. The
analogy, however, is not complete. The benefit to the defendant,
as ilustrated in the case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co.,48 was measurable and here it would be difficult to measure.
Murney v. Thorpe4 9 is as nearly the converse of these cases
as can be found. The defendant drove his car at great speed and
at night, without lights, and violated, as well, other traffic rules,
4,Supra n. 45. Under the crmunal law one cannot by a positive
act take the life of another identified person to save his own (Regina
v. Dudley, L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 273 (1884); Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12
So. 301 (1893). But could he not indirectly do so by eating up all
the food so that the others on the raft would starve? His act is
then one of non-feasance and affects any persons who may chance
to come within the orbit of its influence.
S109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W 221 (1910).
284 Mich. 331, 279 N. W 849 (1938).
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In doing so, he
injured his guest rider. He was refused an emergency instruction. There are clearly two grounds for the refusal. He was
blameworthy in creating the emergency He also had time for
deliberation and the harm was foreseeable, 50 even if he had not
originally been blameworthy
in order to escape a beating by a pursuer.

3.

NEGLIGENCE LEADING UP TO THE EMERGENCY.

Traffic leg2slation and rides of the road. On a dark and
stormy night the defendant was driving on the highway when
he suddenly saw a pedestrian about eight feet in front of himself. The defendant turned sharply to the left to avoid the
pedestrian and as a consequence collided with a vehicle coming
from the opposite direction. The plaintiff, a guest rider in the
approaching vehicle, was injured. The defendant claimed an
emergency instruction. 51 By law in this state a pedestrian is
entitled to use the highway in a district where there are no sidewalk& The statute also requires a driver to drive only at such
speed as will permit him to stop within the assured clear distance
ahead, to employ such headlights as will illumine objects in the
highway for a distance of two hundred feet and also to dim ls
lights on the approach of another vehicle from the opposite
direction. The defendant had violated all of these provisions.
The requirement to dim the lights was held not to cut down the
provision for illumination of objects for a space of two hundred
feet. The defendant was indeed faced with an emergency, but
though he made the best choice possible he was.not entitled to an
emergency instruction. No case has been found where such a
statute created a strict liability, lacking proximate cause.
So, where the defendant drove to the left past a street car
contrary to an ordinance and was obliged to swerve on account of
a pedestrian on the cross-walk ahead of him, he was liable for
In Banks v. Banks, 283 Mich. 506, 278 N. W 665 (1938) defend-

ant was hurrying to take his injured brother, the plaintiff, to a hospital and ran through a red light. His car was struck by another
driver, as a result, and plaintiff was further injured. Plaintiff
brought an action, relying upon a statute providing penalties for
violations of the traffic act (Sec. 4648, 1929 Stat.). Judgment for
defendant n.o.v.
I Curtis v. Hubbel, 182 N. E. 589 (Ohio App. 1932) Defendant
did not succeed in avoiding the pedestrian.
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injuring the plaintiff, though after the emergency arose he did
52
the best possible thing.
The driver of a vehicle is entitled to rely on the expectation
that another driver will observe the rules of the road. Thus, a
driver defendant, in reliance on such expectation, did not stop on
seeing another vehicle being backed out onto the highway in
front of himself. As a result, he was unable to avoid a collision.
The failure of the other driver to stop before entering the highway avoids a charge of negligence made against the defendant
by his guest rider. 53
A violation by the defendant of the statutory rules of the
road to avoid a collision 54 will not necessarily prevent an
emergency instruction. One is privileged to take the left side on
account of defective conditions of the highway on his own side or
because of a prudent choice among other hazards.5 5 Since the
defendant is not under a strict liability, a violation of the rules
of the road must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury
if the latter is to recover, 56 though there may be a recovery if the
defendant, prior to the violation of the rules of the road by himself, had been forced into this violation by prior negligent driving. 57 The defendant is liable if the injury occurred after the
emergency was once and for All over.58 Traffic statutes and
ordinances set up a standard of care which is frequently no
higher (though likely more definite and positive) than the common law rules of due care.
Common law rules of the road. Such statutory provisions
would probably be for the most part common law rules of the
road even without legislation. The requirement to so drive that
stopping is possible within the assured space ahead is binding
'Walker v. Rebeuhr, 255 Mich. 204, 237 N. W 389 (1931)"
Simonson v. Huff, 124 Wash. 549, 215 Pac. 49 (1923) (Defendant

drove on wrong side of street to pass a team and a street car. His
effort to avoid a pedestrian at the crossing will not entitle him to an
emergency instruction).
'

Miller v. Stevens, 63 S. D. 10, 256 N. W 152 (1934)

(Verdict

for defendant should be directed).
"Hagenah v. Bidwell, 189 Pac. 799 (Cal. App. 1920), Sathrum v.
Lee, 180 Minn. 163, 230 N. W 580 (1930); Sheffield v. Union Oil Co.,
82 Wash. 386, 144 Pac. 529 (1914).
Johnson v. Heitman, 88 Wash. 595, 153 Pac. 331 (1915).
Sudbrook v. State, 153 Md. 194, 138 Atl. 12 (1927).
7
Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300 Pac. 518 (1931).
Henderson v Land, 42 Wyo. 369, 295 Pac. 271 (1931).
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at common law and a violation of it will prevent the giving of an
emergency instruction. 59
It is negligent at common law to drive only a short distance
behind another car so that it would be impossible to avoid a
collision if the front vehicle should stop suddenly 60 or to operate
with defective lights ;61 or to fail to check usual speed when passmg a school or along a street where children are ;62 or to enter
traffic with defective brakes ;3 or not to check usual speed at
crossings where pedestrians may be expected to be;64 or not to
anticipate that other cars may be approaching from a cross
66
street; 65 or to pay scant attention to a sign "Men working"
and m such cases no emergency instruction will be given,
Likewise, it is negligent to drive at the usual speed down a
declivity on a gravel road and then be forced to turn sharply
to the left shoulder of the highway to avoid a collision with
another vehicle approaching from a driveway It is foreseeable
that the defendant's car may be overturned and may injure the
guest rider.0 7 Similarly, a driver, on seeing a cloud of dust
'Bowmaster v. De Pree, 252 Mich. 501, 233 N. W 394 (1930)
(Snow storm prevented driver from seeing more than a few feet
ahead. He must drive with corresponding care). Cf. Prior v.
Safeway Stores, 196 Wash. 382, 83 P (2d) 241 (1938) (Cloud of dust
created by a sweeper entered by defendant, from wlch an
emergency developed).
.Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300 Pac. 518 (1931).

statute

in

Cf.

Ohio and many other states, Curtis v. Hubbell, 182 N. E.

589 (Ohio App. 1932)
'Carnahan v. Motor Transit Co., 224 Pac. 143 (Cal. App. 1924)

-frequently

controlled by statute.

'Ratcliffe v. Speith, 95 Kan. 823, 149 Pac. 740 (1915).
"Allen v. Schultz, 107 Wash. 393, 181 Pac. 916 (1919).

" Stone v. Baton Rouge Yellow Cab Co., 12 La. App. 216, 124 So.

778 (1929), McFeat v Philadelphia Co., 69 Atl. 744 (Del. 1908) (A
plaintiff is negligent who puts himself voluntarily in a position of
danger and the emergency thus created does not excuse him. This
case is interesting for another reason. The state constitution provides,
in sec. 22, that "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters
of fact but may state the questions of fact in issue and declare the
law." The judge said in the presence of the jury (after motion by
defendant for non-suit) that he had grave doubt of plaintiff's right
to recover upon the evidence presented but that he thought the case
should go to the jury and that therefore he declined to order a nonsuit. It was held that thus was not a violation of the constitution
because the language was not addressed as an instruction to the
jury).

"Southall v. Smith, 151 La. 967, 92 So. 402 (1922), Lemay v.

Springfield St. Ry. Co., 210 Mass. 63, 96 N. E. 79 (1911) (Motorman
approached a crossing rapidly, failing to observe a mother and child
in the act of passing over the track).
IChaney v. Moore, 101 W Va. 621, 134 S.E.204 (1926).
67Madden v. Peart, 201 Wis. 259, 229 N. W 57 (1930).
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ahead, must anticipate the possibility of other vehicles being
within it.68 So one driving a huge truck in a crowded street
where vehicles are parked and traffic is moving in the opposite
direction, is held to a nice calculation of the space available.
He strikes a parked car at his peril and his only alternative is
to stop and wait.0 9 No subsequent emergency will excuse a
driver at a crossing from looking for an approaching tram. 0
So a plaintiff cannot ignore facts well known by himself and
still claim an emergency instruction to excuse his own negligence. Thus, in Brown v Southwestern Tel. Co., 7 1 the plaintiff
fell into a hole on the defendant's premises near the former's
barn, while attempting to head off a calf. It is hard to see any
application at all of the emergency doctrine here to condone
contributory negligence. In Windsor v MoKee72 the court went
so far as to say that it is not the negligence in an emergency that
the law does not excuse .but rather the negligence that brought
about the emergency While as a practical matter this is usually
true, yet, as elsewhere observed, one must also exhibit the care
of an average prudent person in similar emergencies.
In the rescue cases, is the rescuer, when injured, entitled to
an emergency instruction? If so, he enjoys something in the
nature of a privilege. There are many such cases involving
railway accidents. 73 In Wagner v International By. Co.7 4 the
plaintiff's cousin was negligently hurled from an interurbanstreet car at the beginning of a trestle by the lurch of the car.
The plaintiff got out and walked back to rescue him and was
seriously injured. It being granted that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff was guilty -of contributory negligence
and was not entitled to the benefit of the emergency rule. It was
held that in such cases a liberality in the application of it was
desirable and the court should consider the hurry and excitement
of the plaintiff under the circumstances. So also a truck stop'Prior v. Safeway Stores, 196 Wash. 382, 83 P (2d) 241 (1938).
Cf. Bowmaster v. De Pree, 252 Mich. 501, 233 N. W 394 (1930) (Snow

storm prevents drver from seeing ahead more than a few feet).
1922)

Harton Motor Lines, Inc. v. Currie, 92 F (2d) 164 (4th, 1937).
Hall v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry Co., 240 S. W 175 (Mo.

274 S. W 816 (Mo. 1925).
22 S. W (2d) 65 (Mo. App. 1929).

See Prosser on Torts (1941) pp. 360-361.

"232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
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ping on the left of the road to pull a stalled vehicle from the
ditch is not by that fact guilty of contributory negligence in a
later developing emergency He enjoys a privilege. 75 So one
who approaches to rescue another being gored by a bull is not
guilty of contributory negligence when he himself is injured by
the bull, though it turned out that he extended no aid.7 6 This is
the converse of the case where the actor sees danger to himself
only, foreseeability of dmger to others being excluded by the
emergency
Is there a higher standard of care applicable to professional
rescuers? In Blackwell v. Omaha Athletic Club 77 the plaintiff
and another woman were swimming in a pool. The latter called
for help and the plaintiff responded. The lifeguard thought it
was the plaintiff who was in peril and pulled her out and injured
her. It was held that the lifeguard should use such care in
rescuing as would be used by an ordinarily cautious lifeguard
under like*circumstances. It is interesting that no emergency
instruction was sought.
Are officers who, while engaged in the performance of duty,
fail to observe traffic regulations (as a result of which they either
injure others or are injured by others) entitled to the benefit of
the emergency rule2 The negligent act of A who, when about to
turn onto the main highway, drives to the left of the side road
and stops does not make him liable to an officer who crashed into
A's car by virtue of his riding a motorcycle at a reckless speed.
The officer cannot justify his conduct on the emergency doctrine
and thus escape the consquence of his contributory negligence.
There may also be the defense of lack of proximate cause. 78
In Swoboda v. Brown 79 a motorcycle officer passed defendant at
an intersection and also failed to give a passing signal, both
forbidden by ordinance. He was injured by the defendant,
whom he charged with making a left turn without giving the
appropriate signal. An emergency instruction to offset his o-wn
contributing act was denied him.
'Bowmaster v. De Pree, 252 Mich. 501, 233 N. W 394 (1930).
Lmnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506, 511 (1879).
123 Neb. 332, 242 N. W 664 (1932), noted in 31 Mich. L. Rev.

76

289 (1933).

Judgment for plaintiff. See also Hampton v. Joyce,

infra, note 81 (The reasonable care of prudent police officers)
Cf. 13 N. Y. L. Q. Rev. 129 (1936), Restatement of Torts No. 299d.
I Sudbrook v. State, 153 Md. 194, 138 Atl. 12 (1927) (Judgment

for plaintiff's intestate xeversed).
]' 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N. E. 274 (1935).
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It is the common practice to read into such ordinances an
exception in favor of municipal officers so that there may be no
traffic impediment in the performance of their duties. Tins
practice would have the result of removing contributory negligence as a defense when the officer is the plaintiff. If, however,
his own conduct is the proximate cause of the injury, it would be
unusual to hold the defendant to such a standard of care as to
make him essentially an insurer.80 But where the plaintiff's
speeding is only a contributory cause and the speed rule is
inapplicable to him as an officer, he should recover if the
defendant's negligence was a substantially contributing factor
to the injury s8 It has been suggested that police officers, in
seeking to arrest offenders, must use the reasonable care of the
average prudent police officer in the circumstances.8 2 Thus, one
may assume an actual lower standard of care in the case of a
police officer than is required of the average prudent man,
though, a higher standard may be applied to professional
rescuers. In these cases; however, the emergency, that of
following up a law-breaker, is dissimilar to that here under
discussion. Injury to others is foreseeable. If the officer's
conduct is excused, it is because he is privileged.
4.

THE

FUNCTION OF JUDGE AND JURY.

Dwected verdicts. In Ingle v. Casszdy83 the defendant's
car began to shimmy and at about the same time a tire blew out.
The vehicle went over an embankment and injured the plaintiff,
a passenger in it. There was also some evidence that the
defendant, in her confusion, put her foot on the accelerator
rather than on the brakes. The court non-suited the plaintiff on
the ground that the defendant was faced with an emergency and
was not shown to have acted without due prudence in the
circumstances. The dissenting opinion declares that the question
of the existence of an emergency and of the exercise of due
prudence is universally one for the jury Though one may be
surprised at the fact that the plaintiff was non-suited in tins
case, yet it is a fact that an involuntary non-suit or a directed
verdict is not at all unusual. In 22 cases examined in this study
8*49 Harv. L. Rev. 154 (1936).

81Hampton. v. Joyce, 80 S. W 1066 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)
13 N. Y. L. Q. Rev. 129 (1936).
208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935).
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in winch the court directed a verdict8 4 only one of them was in

favor of the plaintiff.
In Allen v. Sc1ultz85 one might have expected a directed
verdict. There the defendant, whose brakes were defective,
injured a crippled person who was alighting from a street car.
The defendant had approached from a side street, mistook the
speed of the street car, and believed it was not about to stop at
the usual stopping place. When too late, he undertook to go
behind the street car and thus the accident occurred. A directed
verdict seems justified on two grounds (1) assuming that the
defendant was faced with an emergency, his defective brakes
contributed to is inability to extricate himself, (2) he was
negligent in that he did not await the performance of the motorman. There was no serious conflict on these matters in the
evidence. In P2nor v. Safeway Storess8 the amount of damage
only was left to the jury and the court instructed that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law. The defendant
driver saw ahead of himself and going in the same direction, a
road-sweeper, wnch was being operated slowly A great cloud
of dust arose. The defendant also saw, about a quarter of a
mile distant, a car coming from the opposite direction, which he
believed was about to turn onto a side road. The defendant
drove into this dust cloud without checking speed and, finding
himself about to collide with the approaching car, turned right
and into the road-sweeper, injuring the plaintiff, its driver.
In approximately 117 cases studied the court of final jurisdiction approved of 7 directed verdicts for defendant; 12 involuntary
nonsuits and dismissal of petitions; and ordered that 15 judgments
for plaintiff be reversed and judgment be entered for defendant, a
total of 34. One directed verdict for defendant was overruled with
judgment for plaintiff n. o. v. One dismissal wag, not sustained. One
verdict for defendant was overruled and new trial granted on
exceptions.
On the other hand, 43 judgments for plaintiff were sustained
and 13 for defendant; 20 judgments for plaintiff and 12 for defendant
were overruled and remanded for new trial.
Here are some interesting points of comparison. The jury (or
in a few cases the court sitting without a jury) favored the plaintiff
in 75 cases and the defendant in only 24 cases. The court reversed
judgments for plaintiff in 34 cases (in addition, involuntary nonsuits, directed verdicts, and dismissals in 33 cases). It overruled one
directed verdict for defendants and one dismissal, and reversed
judgments for defendants in 12 cases. In 57 cases one of the parties,
generally the defendant, was a corporation,
107 Wash. 393, 181 Pac. 916 (1919).
196- Wash. 382, 83 P (2d) 241 (1938) (Only case of directed
verdict for plaintiff).
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There being no substantial dispute as to the facts, a verdict for
the plaintiff was directed. Tins result probably conforms to the
rule stated in Kentucky,8 7 that the question of the existence of
negligence and contributory negligence is for the jury unless
only one conclusion can be drawn from the proven facts.
In emergency cases there are five questions which commonly
should be for the jury First,'was there a true emergency or
was there time for deliberation9 Second, if there was an
emergency, did the party clainmg the instruction exercise the
proper prudence of the reasonable person faced with an emergency, in extricating himself therefrom? It is not sufficient for him
to use his own individual best judgment. He must exercise the
discretion of the average prudent person who acts under similar
circumstances of emergency Is Third, did he cause the emergency, or was he guilty of negligence immediately prior thereto
which contributed to it2 Fourth, did the opposing party
negligently contribute to the result2 Fifth, was the defendant's
conduct the proximate cause of the injury 2
There are many cases where the evidence shows that the
plaintiff placed himself in a position of peril and fails to show
that the defendant did not act prudently or could have prevented
the harm by an observance of the last clear chance. Thus, in
Kentucky Tractwn & Terminal Co. v Roschli8 9 the evidence
showed that the plaintiff's intestate placed himself and ins team
upon a street car track just-ahead of an oncoming car and that
the defendant did all possible to stop the car before the collision
occurred. There being no contradiction in the evidence, a
directed verdict was proper. Both the doctrine of the last clear
chance and the rule applicable where one acts in an emergency
were considered by the trial court. An instruction as to the one
Padgett v. Brangan, 228 Ky. 440, 22 S. W (2d) 446 (1929).
See, among other cases, Gravel v. Roberge, 125 Me. 399, 134

Atl. 375 (1926), Dahlstrom v. Hurtig, 209 Minn. 72, 295 N. W 508

(1940); Barshadt v. Gresham, 120 S. C. 219, 112 S. E. 923 (1922).
186 Ky. 371, 216 S. W 579 (1919).

See also Fernald v. French,

121 Me. 10, 115 Atl. 420 (1921) (Plaintiff turned his car across the
street just ahead of defendant, who unsuccessfully turned right to
avoid a collision. There was no true alternative here and while
result is sound, there seems to be no occasion for the application of
an emergency rule), Ratcliffe v. Speith, 95 Kan. 823, 149 Pac. 740
(1915) (Flagman waved flag toward plaintiff, who was about to
cross railway track, as a warning. Plaintiff mistakenly interpreted
this as an invitation to cross and was injured. Directed verdict for
defendant, however, overruled and new trial).
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issue would seem to preclude one respecting the other where
there is no conflict in evidence. If there -was a last clear chance,
the defendant was faced with no emergency If the defendant
acted in an emergency, he did not have the last clear chance.
In Penningtonv. Pure Milk Co.90 a truck driver suddenly found
several boys coasting on hand-sleds onto the highway
He swerved to the left m an unsuccessful attempt to avoid them.
Contributory negligence not being chargeable to the- children,
it was held that the defendant was entitled to a peremptory
instruction because of -failure to show lack of prudent conduct
on his part in the emergency Thus, the existence of an emergency, the absence of prior fault, and of contributory negligence (by
the plaintiff's intestate) and of prudent conduct were all for the
court under the evidence. Similar is Stewart v Central Vt. Ry.
Co.91 where the conductor of a tram threw the emergency brake
to avoid injuring a would be passenger who fell almost beneath
the coach while rushing to board the train. The sudden stop
threw and injured the plaintiff, a passenger, who had not yet
found a seat within the passenger coach.
The existence of an emergency and +,7eexercise of due care
279 Ky. 235, 130 S. W (2d) 24 (1939).
86 Vt. 398, 85 Atl. 745 (1913). Cf. Lunzer v. Pittsburgh & L. E.
R. Co., 296 Pa. 393, 145 Atl. 907 (1929) (Plaintiff sought to avoid contributory negligence by proving an emergency. But his prior negligence prevents an emergency instruction and no showing here of
negligence on part of defendant nor of last clear chance); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Noller, 36 F (2d) 443 (7th 1930) (Bus turned
left to avoid car in front, which stopped suddenly. Driver had
three alternatives-go straight, turn right and hit curb and telephone poles, turn left and collide with plaintiff, approaching in a
car. Chose latter. Not liable as matter of law); Kalso v. Wilson,
252 Mich. 520, 233 N. W 401 (1930) (Defendant forced to apply
brakes suddenly to avoid a negligent driver and skidded into a telephone pole, thus ijurmg a guest rider); Burlie v. Stephens, 113
Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684 (1920) (Plaintiff was on roller skates on
wrong side of street. Created an emergency for defendant. Fact
that defendant was exceeding the speed limit was not the proximate
cause of injury. Plaintiff was non-suited); Madden v. Peart, 201
Wis. 259, 229 N. W 57 (1930) (Defendant saw a car approaching from
a driveway at right angle with the highway and turned sharply left
onto the shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. Car skidded and
overturned and guest rider killed. The defendant is not guilty of
failure of due care in the emergency); Miller v. Stevens, 63 S. D. 10,
256 N. W 152 (1934) (Defendant relied on the observance of the
rules of the road by another driver. The latter was backing out
from a driveway in front of defendant. Defendant did not stop but
later swerved to the left when it was too late to stop. A collision
was not thus avoided and a guest in defendant's vehicle sued
hum He gets a directed verdict).
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are jury questwns generally. As above indicated, many courts
hold that these emergency eases are for the jury It would be
difficult to reconcile them all with the cases just considered.
Thus, in Carpenter v Campbell Auto 0o. 9 2 the court says that
the existence of an emergency is for the jury and also the
question whether the defendant exercised in the emergency
(if there was one) the necessary prudence (should he have
turned left or right) and also, if there was an emergency,
whether the defendant's earlier negligence contributed to bring
it about. After the emergency was passed, did he recover the
aplomb of the average careful man so as to meet new exigencies
Elmore v. Des Mones City Ry. Co. 9 3 seems to be an extreme case
and no motion for a directed verdict was made by either side.
A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed. As the plaintiff was
descending from a street railway the car lurched and she was onher feet but in an unbalanced position. As the street car moved
on, she grasped the rear bumper and was dragged three-fourths
of a mile. She mistakenly feared to let go on account of the
presence of a vehicle just behind. The emergency being
conceded, it was an issue for the jury whether she exercised
appropriate prudence in clinging to the bumper, from winch fact
she suffered seriously
A question for the jury is, did the party pleading the
emergency exercise the prudence of an average man so that he
acted as an average man would under similar circumstances?
Undoubtedly some of these cases would, in some states, require
a directed verdict. In Sieb v. Central Pennsylvanta Traction
Co.94 the plaintiff's intestate was riding in a wagon. The horse
became frightened and the driver cut across a street car track to
bring him under control. Decedent jumped from the wagon and
was killed. The motorman could have stopped in time to avoid
the accident. It was left to the jury whether decedent was guilty
of contributory negligence so. as to prevent a recovery or was
excused by the emergency Likewise, in Casey v Siciliano9 5 the
Iowa 52, 140 N. W 225 (1913).
2159

1207 Iowa 862, 224 N. W 28 (1929).
1'47 Pa. Sup. 228 (1911), Brooks v. Petersham, 16 Gray 181

(1860) (Due to some defects m the street, plaintiff's horse became
unmanageable and ran away. Plaintiff, having lost control, turned
the horse from the road and was injured. The facts seem to indicate
that plaintiff, by imprudence in the emergency, was guilty of contributory negligence, but the facts are not very clear).
.310 Pa. 238, 165 At. 1 (1933); Kosrofian v. Donnelly, 117 AtL
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defendant attempted to pass a street car in which the plaintiff
was a passenger. The street car had stopped. A child suddenly
appeared and the defendant cut quickly to the right to avoid the
child, thus injuring the plaintiff, a street car passenger. It seems
that there was an emergency not of defendant's own making and
the question of contributory negligence, therefore, did not arise.
It has been observed that while courts somewhat readily
direct verdicts (or the equivalent) for the defendant, they are
reluctant to do so for the plaintiff and cases involving an
emergency, when they do so, are rare. Thus, in Austin v
Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co.,9 6 while the plaintiff was driving
properly in a narrow street, two vehicles were rapidly coming
toward him from the opposite direction. On the plaintiff's right
was a street car line and a street car was approaching him from
the rear. Fearing that there was not sufficient space to avoid
the vehicles in front, he turned right upon the street car line and
was struck by the street car. The court refused him a directed
verdict, though it observed that a mistaken choice may be
prudent. Measurements showed that he could have continued
straight ahead without colliding.
Concluon. If this discussion has value, it is likely to arise
more from the illustrations and groupings than from any
formulation of conclusions that can be precisely stated. An
emergency arises when a person is required to take one of
several courses and has no opportunity to deliberate, which course
involves greater peril to himself or to others, or to both himself
and others. The peril would be foreseeable if there were opportunity for the actor to consider the ultimate possible consequences of his conduct. He is privileged to adopt a course prudent under the circumstances, which would not have been appropriate but for the emergency Fright and confusion are often
present but their absence will not necessarily prevent an emergency instruction. The result may depend on the fact that children
are affected, or by the possibility of a last clear chance. If a party
421 (R. I. 1922) (Defendant swerved his car to the left to avoid- a
pedestrian who suddenly ran out in front. He collided with plaintiff's car going in the opposite direction. He claims a directed verdict. Held, both question of proximate cause and of due prudence
in an emergency are for the jury); Rawlings v. Erwin Motor &
Machine Co., 67 Pa. Sup. 88 (1916) (Question of due prudence shown
by plaintiff in emergency and also contributory negligence on his
part, which may well be identical).
"269 Mass. 420, 169 N. E. 484 (1929).
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created his own emergency, he is not entitled to an emergency
instruction where he violates a statute or the rules of the road.
An emergency may remove the charge of contributory negligence on the one hand and also the claim of the last clear chance
on the other.
Generally speaking, the issue of the existence of an emergency and the question of the exercise of due care in the emergency
are decided by the jury This study tends to indicate that at
least in emergency cases a verdict is rarely directed for the
plaintiff, but it is not rare that a verdict or its equivalent is
directed for the defendant. Many more judgments for the
plaintiff are reversed than are reversed for the defendant and
the jury finds for the plaintiff much more frequently than for
the defendant.
-There are certain cases where the actor has acted precipitately in order to avoid an immediate danger to himself. It is
hard to conceive that in these cases even an instant's reflection
would not have foretold danger to others. This fact of innmediate
personal danger is held adequate to create a privilege in the
interest of self preservation unless the actor's conduct in coming
into the emergency was blameworthy
Thus, the emergency
doctrine has taken a new step. As in the Vincent case, where
property was affected, so here, where personal safety is involved,
one may put the immediate loss onto another, at least if that other
person is unidentified at the time. So far no method has been
found of weighing the advantage to him and the harm to the
other by giving damages, measured either by the value of the advantage to the defendant or the harm to the plaintiff. If, however, a party by his own negligence created the emergency, he
cannot have the benefit of an emergency instruction to excuse
his negligence. The cases examined are insufficient to permit of
general conclusions regarding children or experts who are faced
with emergencies.

